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CRIMINAL LAW-MULTIPLE PUNISHMENT UNDER THE ORGANIZED
CRIME CONTROL ACT-A NEED FOR REEXAMINATION OF WHARTON'S
RULE AND DOUBLE JEOPARDY-lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770
(1975).
Robert lannelli and seven other petitioners were charged with
conspiring' to violate and violating 18 U.S.C. § 1955, a federal gam-
bling statute which makes it a crime for five or more persons to con-
duct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own a gambling business
prohibited by state law. Each petitioner was convicted of both of-
fenses, and each was sentenced under both counts. On appeal the peti-
tioners argued that conviction of both conspiracy and the substantive
offense was precluded by Wharton's Rule, a common law exception to
the principle that a substantive offense and a conspiracy to commit
the offense are distinct and separately punishable. The Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit affirmed the convictions, finding that a
recognized exception to Wharton's Rule permitted prosecution and
punishment for both offenses.2 The United States Supreme Court, in a
5-4 decision, affirmed on different grounds. It held that Wharton's
Rule is only a judicial presumption which was rendered inapplicable
by a congressional intent to permit punishment for both the con-
spiracy and the substantive offense. Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S.
770 (1975). 3
This note analyzes the Court's finding of a legislative intent to over-
come the presumption of Wharton's Rule. It will further analyze
Wharton's Rule and its justifications, and the principles of double
jeopardy as applied to the multiple convictions in Iannelli. It will be
I. The general conspiracy statute under which this action was brought, and under
which petitioners were convicted, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1970), provides:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the United
States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or
for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any act to effect the object
of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than $10.000 or imprisoned not
more than five years. or both.
2. United States v. lannelli, 477 F.2d 999 (3d Cir. 1973).
3. After the Supreme Court's affirmance of his conviction, Robert Iannelli tried
unsuccessfully to move for a new trial on the grounds that newly discovered evidence
showed that a court-ordered electronic surveillance had been conducted without author-
ization by the Attorney General of the United States. The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit affirmed the lower court's denial of the motion on the grounds that such
evidence could have been discovered at the time of trial, and that there was no excuse
for the lack of diligence in pursuing such an avenue of inquiry. United States v. Ian-
nelli, 528 F.2d 1290 (3d Cir. 1976).
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argued that the Court failed to weigh carefully (a) the doctrinal justifi-
cations for the law of conspiracy, and (b) the principle of prohibiting
multiple punishment for the same offense, which underlies both Whar-
ton's Rule and the double jeopardy concept. The note concludes that
the Court erred in finding a congressional intent to overcome this pre-
sumptive rule of statutory construction and that the multiple convic-
tions should have been held invalid as violative of double jeopardy
principles.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Purpose and Scope of 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970)
In 1970 Congress enacted the Organized Crime Control Act4 for
the purpose of striking at large syndicated gambling operations. Title
VIII of the Act contains two provisions. The first makes it a federal
felony to obstruct enforcement of local laws against gambling by
means of bribery and corruption of government officials. 5 The second
provision, section 1955, provides: 6
a) Whoever conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns
all or part of an illegal gambling business shall be fined not more than
$20,000 or imprisoned not more than five years or both.
b) As used in this section-
1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which
(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in
which it is conducted;
(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, man-
age, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and
(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation
for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of
$2,000 in any single day.
The purpose of this section was to diminish substantially the flow of
revenue from large scale gambling operations to organized crime.7
4. Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922.
5. 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970). See note 36 infra.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1970).
7. See S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1969). The Senate Report
estimated that such illegal wagering resulted in an annual profit of approximately $6
to $7 billion for organized crime. Id. Congress found that this supply of money was a




Through subsection (b), Congress assumed jurisdiction to legislate in
an area which traditionally belonged to the states. The legislation,
aimed only at operations large enough to affect the national interest,
8
makes the gambling operation a federal crime when there are five or
more participants. This requirement of multiple participants led pros-
ecutors to bring two-count indictments against defendants, charging
violation of both section 1955 and 18 U.S.C. § 371, the general con-
spiracy statute. Prior to the lannelli decision, the various federal
courts disagreed as to whether a defendant could be convicted of both
the conspiracy to violate the act and the substantive offense itself. The
pivotal question in these cases and in Iannelli was whether Wharton's
Rule prohibited the use of conspiracy charges to enhance punishment
for violation of section 1955. 9
B. The Relation of Wharton's Rule to the Law of Conspiracy
An understanding of the proper application of Wharton's Rule re-
quires an initial recognition that the law of conspiracy'0 serves two
separate doctrinal functions. "In the first place, it is an inchoate crime,
complementing the provisions dealing with attempt and solicitation in
reaching preparatory conduct before it has matured into commission
of a substantive offense."" Secondly, conspiracy law "is a means of
striking against the special danger incident to group activity .... ,12
The underlying rationale of the latter is that a conspiracy to commit
an offense presents a danger to society which is greater than commis-
8. See S. REP. No. 91-617. 91stCong.. IstSess. 73-74(1969).
9. E.g., the Rule does not apply: United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Becker,
461 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1972).
The Rule does apply: United States v. Hunter. 478 F.2d 1019 (7th Cir.). cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 857 (1973); United States v. Whitaker, 372 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Pa.
1974); United States v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1971); United
States v. Figueredo. 350 F. Supp. 1031 (M.D. Fla. 1972). rev'd sub non. United
States v. Vaglica. 490 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974).
10.
[C] onspiracy is a combination between two or more persons formed for the
purpose of doing either an unlawful act or a lawful act by unlawful means. ...
Although a more precise definition of conspiracy may be difficult, it is useful to
keep in mind that conspiracy, like most other offenses, requires both an act and
an accompanying mental state. The agreement constitutes the act, while the in-
tention to thereby achieve the objective is the mental state.
W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW 454-55 (1972) (footnotes omitted).
11. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03, Comment at 96 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
12. ld. at 96.
144
Vol. 52: 142, 1976
Multiple Punishment
sion of the substantive offense itself.13 Collective action toward an
antisocial end is thus considered a greater risk to society than indi-
vidual action toward the same end. In this regard, a commonly ad-
vanced justification for conspiracy is its importance as a prosecutorial
weapon in combating organized crime.14
Under certain circumstances, however, a conspiracy conviction will
not serve any of these functions, and therefore cannot be justified.
First, certain crimes cannot be committed in the absence of a concert
of action.' 5 In this situation the requisite conspiracy poses no greater
threat than commission of the substantive offense. Secondly, if an in-
dividual is convicted of the substantive offense which was the object
of the conspiracy, there obviously is no opportunity for preventative
intervention or application of the inchoate offense rationale. More-
over, the substantive conviction serves to control organized crime.
Accordingly, Wharton's Rule' 6 forbids separation of the substantive
offense and the conspiracy to commit that offense where concert of
13. This rationale was expressed by Justice Frankfurter in the following manner:
[C] ollective criminal agreement-partnership in crime-presents a greater po-
tential threat to the public than individual delicts. Concerted action both increases
the likelihood that the criminal object will be successfully attained and decreases
the probability that the individuals involved will depart from their path of crim-
inality. Group association for criminal purposes often, if not normally, makes
possible the attainment of ends more complex than those which one criminal
could accomplish. Nor is the danger of a conspiratorial group limited to the par-
ticular end toward which it has embarked. Combination in crime makes more
likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the original purpose for which the
group was formed. In sum, the danger which a conspiracy generates is not con-
fined to the substantive offense which is the immediate aim of the enterprise.
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961) (footnote omitted). See also
Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S.
640, 644 (1946); Note, The Conspiracy Dilemma: Prosecution of Group Crime of
Protection of Individual Defendants, 62 HARv. L. REv. 276, 283 (1948).
14. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV.
920, 922 (1959), where it is stated that in the setting of organized criminal activity,
conspiracy
serves to nullify the opportunities for escaping punishment that the defendant
might otherwise obtain from the anonymity of his position within a group or from
the difficulty of tracing his precise contribution to any given substantive offense.
In other cases it facilitates the intervention of the law at a stage when antisocial
consequences can still be prevented.
15. Justice Powell, writing for the majority in lannelli, listed the classic Wharton's
Rule offenses which require concert of action as adultery, incest, bigamy, and dueling.
420 U.S. at 782.
16. The Rule is named after Francis Wharton, who first identified and developed
the principle from American case law. In lannelli, 420 U.S. at 780, n.12, Justice
Powell noted that the origin of the Rule is based in a Pennsylvania decision, Shannon
v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850), which Wharton first reported in the sixth edition
of his treatise in 1868 as based on principles of double jeopardy.
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action, essential to conspiracy liability, is a necessary element of the
substantive offense. The Rule has been defined as providing: 17
When to the idea of an offense plurality of agents is logically neces-
sary, conspiracy which assumes the voluntary accession of a person to
a crime of such a character that it is aggravated by a plurality of
agents, cannot be maintained.
The justifying rationale of the Rule is three-fold. The principal jus-
tification is based on legislative intent: where cooperative action is a
prerequisite to commission of the substantive offense, it is presumed
that the legislature necessarily considered that element in establishing
the maximum punishment for the offense. 18 Secondly, where legisla-
tion seeks to prevent the very evil which conspiracy law addresses,
more than one conviction for the same offense is unnecessary and ar-
bitrary.' 9 Finally, if the conspiracy involves no more than the planned
commission of the single substantive offense, the "increased danger"
rationale of conspiracy is rendered unpersuasive and no longer justi-
fies the added sanction of a conspiracy prosecution. 20
In applying the Rule to the circumstances of a particular case, cer-
tain inherent limitations confine the range of its use. First, the crime
must have been committed.2' Secondly, concerted action must be logi-
cally necessary, i.e., the substantive offense must not have been ca-
17. 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1604, at 1862 (12th ed. 1932). The most
recent edition of Wharton's treatise states the Rule in simplistic terms: "An agreement
by two persons to commit a particular crime cannot be prosecuted as a conspiracy
when the crime is of such a nature as to necessarily require the participation of two
persons for its commission." 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCE-
DURE § 89, at 191 (1957).
18. See 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 89, at 194
(1957), stating: "By this view it is contended that when punishment is provided for
all necessary participants in the substantive crime, a legislative intent is shown that no
further punishment by way of conspiracy is intended." See also I WORKING PAPERS OF
THE NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS 334 (July 1970); Note,
Gambling Under the Organized Crime Control Act: Wharton's Rule and the Odds on
Conspiracy, 59 IOWA L. REV. 452, 457 (1973).
19. The second justifying rationale advanced is derived from the first, focusing
upon the evil which the law seeks to prevent, rather than the punishment imposed. It
is stated by Justice Douglas in the following manner: "Wharton's Rule teaches that
where the substantive crime itself is aimed at the evils traditionally addressed by the
law of conspiracy, separability should not be found unless the clearest legislative state-
ment demands it." lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 793 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
(footnote omitted).
20. See text accompanying notes 88-91 infra.
21. 2 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW § 1604 (12th ed. 1932). See, e.g., United States
v. Zeuli, 137 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1943) (L. Hand, J.). This limitation on the Rule
avoids the result of immunizing conspiratorial preparation and overlooking the func-
tion of conspiracy as an inchoate crime.
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pable of commission by one of the conspirators alone.22 Finally, a
"third party" exception renders the Rule inapplicable where the con-
spiracy involves more persons than are required for commission of the
substantive offense.23
II. APPLICATION OF WHARTON'S RULE TO SECTION
1955
Section 1955's definition of "illegal gambling business" requires
that five or more persons "conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct,
or own" such a business.24 Therefore, concert of action is clearly a
necessary element of the crime,25 and Wharton's Rule should apply
unless precluded by one of its exceptions or overridden by a clear
22. See, e.g., 1. R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 89, at
192-93 (1957). It has also been said that the Rule does not apply where the law de-
fining 'the substantive offense does not specify any punishment for one of the partici-
pants. Id. The reasoning advanced for this exception is that if the statute creating
the substantive offense provides a punishment for only one of the actors the of-
fense is capable of commission by only one of the parties and no longer requires
concert of action. See Vannata v. United States, 289 F. 424 (2d Cir. 1923). This rea-
soning is faulty because concert of action is a necessary fact which cannot be made
less necessary by making it nonculpable on the part of one of the actors. Further-
more, the original Wharton's Rule case, Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226 (1850),
involved such a statute; the act prohibiting adultery provided punishment only for
the party who was married. See Helfrich v. Commonwealth, 33 Pa. 68 (1859).
23. A defendant in such a case may be convicted of both the conspiracy and
the offense. For example, two persons who commit adultery cannot be convicted
for both adultery and conspiracy to commit adultery. However, when a third per-
son, e.g., a "matchmaker," conspires with a man and a woman for the commission
of adultery by the latter two, the exception applies and all three are guilty of con-
spiracy. See 1 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE § 89, at 193
(1957); State v. Clemenson, 123 Iowa 524, 99 N.W. 139 (1904).
24. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
25. The Government's argument in lannelli was based primarily upon the position
that § 1955 did not require conspiracy for its commission, making Wharton's Rule
inapplicable:
The defendant himself, of course, must be shown to have guilty knowledge or
criminal intent, but it is no part of the proof required by Section 1955 that the
other participants in the business also had criminal intent or that they were party
to a corrupt agreement with the defendant.
Brief for Respondent at 28, lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975).
This argument created some division of opinion in the lower federal courts. But
even those courts which applied the "third party" exception to Wharton's Rule, see
notes 45-49 infra, accepted the fact that conspiratorial concert of action was a requisite
element of the offense. See, e.g., United States v. Becker, 461 F.2d 230, 234 (2d Cir.
1972). Those courts which held the Rule to be applicable clearly found the conspiracy
to be a necessary element. For example, the court in United States v. Greenberg, 334
F. Supp. 1092, 1095 (N.D. Ohio 1971) stated: "[T]he offense is one involving the
element of concursus necessarius. That is, it is absolutely necessary that there be a
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manifestation of congressional intent to authorize separate punish-
ments. 26 The following discussion establishes that the Iannelli Court's
finding of a clear congressional intent to authorize multiple punish-
ments is unwarranted; that section 1955 does not fall within one of
the traditional exceptions to the Rule's application; and that Whar-
ton's Rule should be modified so as to accommodate the doctrinal jus-
tifications of the law of conspiracy.
A. Legislative Intent
The Iannelli majority held Wharton's Rule inapplicable because
Congress had manifested "a clear and unmistakable legislative judg-
ment that more than outweighs any presumption of merger between
the conspiracy to violate § 1955 and the consummation of that sub-
plurality of parties and it is necessary that there be concerted action among them."
Concert of action seems to be necessary because the five or more persons involved
must "conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own" the gambling business. The
conspiratorial agreement need not be explicit but may be implicit in the fact of collab-
oration or the existence of other circumstances. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL
LAW § 61, at 457-58 (1972). Under a normal reading of the statute, five or more per-
sons could not "conduct" a gambling business without mutual cooperation. Thus, the
statute reaches only those persons who conduct the operation without knowledge of
and in conjunction with other persons involved. Accord, United States v. Guzek. 527
F.2d 552, 557 (8th Cir. 1975).
The original language of the act provided that the offense involve "five or more per-
sons who participate in the gambling activity." S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. 17 (1969) (emphasis added). Whether a requirement of "participation" would
require concerted action is not clear. but the more explicit definition in the final version
of § 1955 does. As Judge (now Justice) Stevens stated in United States v. Hunter. 478
F.2d 1019. 1025-26 (7th Cir. 1973):
[B] oth alleged offenses require "the mutual cooperation" or the "reciprocal action"
of a plurality of persons.... [T] he conspiracy covers nothing more than the sub-
stantive crime committed by the conspirators. There is no suggestion that the
proof of intent required for the violation of § 1955 is any different from the evi-
dence required to sustain the charge of conspiracy.
See also United States v. Whitaker, 372 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Pa. 1974). For two court
decisions which accepted the proposition that § 1955 does not require conspiratorial
activity of five or more persons, see United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554 (5th Cir.
1974); United States v. Bobo. 477 F.2d 974, 987 (4th Cir. 1973).
The majority in lannelli touched on this issue only tangentially when it stated that
agreement was "not contained in the statutory definition of the § 1955 offense." 420
U.S. at 785 n.17. But the absence of agreement from the statutory definition of the
crime does not remove it as a necessary element in the commission of the crime. As
the dissent pointed out: "The enterprises to which Congress was referring in § 1955 can-
not, as a practical matter, be created and perpetuated without the agreement and co-
ordination that characterize conspiracy." Id. at 795 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
26. As the Rule is primarily based on a presumption of legislative intent, it may
be rebutted where the legislature clearly expresses an intent to permit both prosecu-
tions and convictions. See note 18 and accompanying text supra.
148
Multiple Punishment
stantive offense."'27 Wharton's Rule was found to have validity "only
as a judicial presumption to be applied in the absence of legislative
intent to the contrary. '28 This statement indicates that the Rule should
apply unless it is shown that the legislature intended otherwise.29
The Court did not consistently adhere to this standard, however.
After analyzing the Act's legislative history, the Court departed from
its earlier declaration of the Rule's presumptive validity, and stated:
"Had Congress intended to foreclose the possibility of prosecuting
conspiracy offenses under § 371 ... we think it would have so indi-
cated explicitly."30 This position completely shifts the burden from
requiring the prosecution to show clear legislative intent to rebut the
Rule's presumptive applicability, to presuming that the Rule does not
apply unless the legislature "explicitly" indicated that it should. This
standard, if extended beyond the instant case, could effectively abolish
Wharton's Rule as a viable doctrine in criminal law.
The Court did not make explicit which of its two enunciated stan-
dards was the basis for its decision. It stated, however, that the legisla-
tive intent to permit multiple convictions "more than outweighs any
presumption of merger, 31 thus acknowledging the Rule's continued
viability but leaving undefined its weight and scope. It is assumed for
the purposes of this discussion that the Court used the former stan-
dard, requiring legislative intent to overcome the presumptive applica-
bility of the Rule. 32
27. 420 U.S. at 791. It is interesting to note that the Government's brief conceded
that Wharton's Rule would apply to § 1955 if concert of action were a necessary ele-
ment of the § 1955 offense. Indeed, no lower federal court which considered the ques-
tion prior to lannelli used the majority's analysis of legislative intent to rebut the pre-
sumption of Wharton's Rule. But cf. United States v. Pacheco, 489 F.2d 554 (5th Cir.
1974) (stating that the jurisdictional requirement of § 1955 was unrelated to the
criminal character of the conduct involved). See notes 40-42 and accompanying text
infra.
28. 420 U.S. at 782.
29. No legislature has ever enacted legislation to alter or abolish the Rule. The
majority statement here indicates that, at the minimum, the Rule still operates as a
rebuttable presumption. The dissent's position was that the Rule should not be over-
come "unless the clearest legislative statement demands it." Id. at 793 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting). Yet, the relative weight to be given the presumption does not seem to be
the determinative factor in distinguishing the two opinions. Rather, the dissent simply
found no congressional intent to nullify the Rule.
30. 420 U.S. at 789 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 791.
32. After enunciating the two completely different standards, the Court stated that
"there simply is no basis for relying on a presumption to reach a result so plainly at
odds with congressional intent." Id. at 790-91. It thus appears that the Court did use,
at least in name, the presumption of the Rule's applicability. The result of the case is
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There is no indication that Congress, in enacting Title VIII, ever
considered the precise question of whether both a conspiracy convic-
tion and a conviction for violation of section 1955 could be main-
tained. Thus, a judicial finding of legislative intent to permit multiple
punishment must be by implication. In this regard, the applicable
principle of statutory construction states that courts must strictly con-
strue penal statutes against the state and may not enlarge their scope
by implication. 33
An analysis of the Act and its history reveals little to help determine
whether Congress intended to authorize multiple punishment. The
Court's finding of a clear intent to rebut the Rule was based on three
factors. First, from a congressional purpose to strike strongly at syndi-
cated gambling,34 the Court inferred a clear intent to permit convic-
tion for both conspiracy and violation of section 1955. Convicting the
defendants for violation of the substantive offense, however, ade-
quately fulfills the purpose of prohibiting the gambling enterprises of
organized crime. The addition of a conspiracy conviction based on
the same conduct that results in the section 1955 conviction does not
serve to promote the elimination of illegal gambling; it merely affords
an additional form of punishment to be administered according to the
discretion of the prosecutor or the judge.35 Secondly, the Court fur-
easier to explain, however, if the opinion is analyzed in terms of the standard which
requires explicit intent for the Rule to apply.
33. Where there is doubt as to what the legislature meant, the least severe con-
struction should be applied. For Supreme Court decisions applying this rule of con-
struction so as to avoid multiple convictions, see note 74 infra. See generally E. CRAW-
FORD, THE CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES 453-66 (1940); H. BLACK, CONSTRUCTION AND
INTERPRETATION OF THE LAWS 451-56 (2d ed. 1911).
34. Congressional intent to expand the attack against organized crime is apparent
from the Senate Report on the bill:
A more effective effort must be mounted to eliminate illegal gambling. In that
effort the Federal Government must be able not only to deny the use and facilities
of interstate commerce to the day-to-day operations of illegal gamblers-as it can
do under existing statutes-but also to prohibit directly substantial business enter-
prises of gambling, and the attendant corruption of State law-enforcement officials.
S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 73 (1969).
35. Under such circumstances it would be preferable to create a strong inference
that the multiple statutes are only to allow alternative means of prosecution.
Double punishment is not the only problem facing defendants charged with violat-
ing § 1955 and the conspiracy statutes. The addition of the conspiracy count may place
a defendant at a distinct procedural disadvantage, and gives the prosecutor an advan-
tage he would not normally have.
By means of evidence inadmissable under usual rules the prosecutor can impli-
cate the defendant not only in the conspiracy itself but also in the substantive
crimes of his alleged coconspirators. In a large conspiracy trial the effect produced
upon the jury by the introduction of evidence against some defendants may result
in conviction for all of them, so that the fate of each may depend not on the
150
Multiple Punishment
ther maintained that a conspiracy count could be added to the sub-
stantive offense because Congress, aware of the conspiracy-substantive
offense distinction, chose to use "conspiracy" to define a section 1511
violation but not a section 1955 offense.36 This emphasis on the stat-
utory language overlooks the action prohibited by section 1955: any
group of five or more persons which "conducts, finances, manages,
supervises, directs or owns" an illegal gambling business, must have
conspired to do so.3 Thus, although not explicitly defined as such,
conspiracy is a necessary element of the substantive offense,38 and
Wharton's Rule should apply.39
merits of his own case but rather on his success in disassociating himself from his
codefendants in the minds of the jury.
Developments in the Law--Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv. 920, 922 (1959)
(footnotes omitted). See also Wechsler, Jones & Korn, The Treatment of Inchoate
Crimes in the Model Penal Code of the American Law Institute: Attempt, Solicitation,
and Conspiracy, Part Two, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 957, 959 (1961).
36. 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (1970). This section accompanied § 1955 in the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970 as Title VIII-Syndicated Gambling. It provides in part:
(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the
enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision thereof, with
the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if-
(1) one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of such a
conspiracy;
(2) one or more of such persons is an official or emnployee, elected, appointed,
or otherwise, of such State or political subdivision; and
(3) one or more of such persons conducts, finances, manages, supervises,
directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.
Subsection (b) provides the same definition of "illegal gambling business" as used in
§ 1955. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
37. See note 25 supra.
38. The presumption should therefore exist that the legislature considered the con-
spiratorial element of the offense in fixing the punishment. The maximum sentence for
violation of § 1955 is a $20,000 fine and five years imprisonment. lannelli permits the
additional sentencing for conspiracy under the general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 371 (1970), which carries a maximum sentence of a $10,000 fine or five years im-
prisonment, or both. Thus, a person who violates § 1955 faces the possibility of re-
ceiving a $30,000 fine and 10 years in prison.
The fact that the defendant's activity falls within the prohibition of two statutes
does not indicate intent on the part of the legislature to provide multiple convictions.
As one commentator has stated:
The mere existence of two statutory offenses does not establish that the legisla-
ture intended each to be independently convictable and punishable when both are
committed in a single course of conduct. It is just as likely that the legislature in-
tended only to provide two avenues of prosecution or create alternative classes of
wrongdoers differentiated by gradations in punishment.
Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 312 (1965).
39. The Court's own definition of the Rule would indicate its applicability here:
Wharton's Rule applies only to offenses that require concerted criminal activity,
a plurality of criminal agents. In such cases, a closer relationship exists between
the conspiracy and the substantive offense because both require collective crim-
inal activity.... [T] he Rule supports a presumption that the two merge when the
substantive offense is proved.
420 U.S. at 785-86 (emphasis in original).
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Finally, the majority argued that the definitional requirement of
"five or more persons" was intended only as a jurisdictional element of
the offense, and should not act to merge the conspiracy and the sub-
stantive offense into a single crime.40 It is undoubtedly true that the
definitional elements of "illegal gambling business" were intended to
activate federal jurisdiction only with regard to large gambling enter-
prises.41 It is also true, however, that there is no federal crime under
the act unless five or more persons conspire to conduct an illegal
gambling business. The "jurisdictional" argument may accurately re-
flect the purpose of the definitional requirement, but it does not indi-
cate any congressional purpose to authorize multiple convictions.
Thus, for the purposes of determining whether the Rule applies, it
should make no difference that the requirement is "jurisdictional. '42
It is submitted that the Court in Iannelli did not soundly demon-
strate that Congress intended to provide for multiple convictions
under section 1955.43 Rather, it transformed the general purpose of
40. 420 U.S. at 789-90.
41. The Senate Report expressed concern with those enterprises which are "so
substantial as to be a matter of national concern." S. REP. No. 91-617, 91st Cong..
1st Sess. 73 (1969).
42. This jurisdictional argument was resolutely rejected in United States v. Whit-
aker, 372 F. Supp. 154 (M.D. Pa. 1974). The Government argued that group activity
is not part of the crime itself, but was only included in the statute as a ground for
federal jurisdiction. The court disagreed:
While the 5 person requirement may be jurisdictional, unless it is met no federal
crime has been committed .... And the effect of the requirement of § 1955 that
five or more persons engage in the gambling business is necessary to build into the
crime a conspiracy by the five participants to conduct a gambling business. With-
out such an agreement, the intent of the defendants to engage in the gambling
business could not be found.
Id. at 160. See also United States v. Hunter, 478 F.2d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 1973).
43. There are several other factors which the Court seemed to weigh. First. Con-
gress provided for sentence enhancement in Title X of the Act. codified in 18 U.S.C. §§
3575-78 (1970). This is not applicable to violators of § 1955, however, because en-
hancement of a sentence under § 3575 requires various procedural requirements in-
cluding a judge's special finding that the defendant is dangerous.
Another reason Justice Powell advanced for not applying the Rule was that the
parties prosecuted for the conspiracy need not be the same persons as those prose-
cuted for the substantive offense. 420 U.S. at 784. The opinion indicates that because
gambling organizations are complex and participants' levels of culpability might vary
significantly, prosecutors should have the discretion to bring both counts against some
parties but only the substantive count against others. It seems a questionable policy
for the Court to endorse the power of a prosecutor to effect multiple punishment
against arbitrarily chosen parties to the same collective criminal activity. Although
prosecutorial discretion is unavoidable in our criminal procedure, "the compelling
reasons for letting the prosecutor allocate his limited resources and determine whether
the evidence warrants prosecution do not support his discretion to seek multiple pun-
ishment. Nothing about the prosecutor's role makes him fit to pass sentence." Note,
Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 38, at 305-06 (1965) (footnote omitted). The dissent
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the Act-to strengthen, the attack against orgamzed crime-into a
specific intent to authorize two convictions-even though the.Act Was
completely silent, on the matter. Thus, the Court seems not only to
have created the legislative intent itself, but-to have departed from-the
principle of strictly construing criminal-statutes. 44'
B. The Third Party Exception
The Court, of Appeals for the Thrd Circuit had affirmed the mul-
tiple. convictions in lannelli on the, ground ,that thethird party excep-
tion to Wharton's Rule .applies when more than -five persons are in-
dicted, both for violation of section 1955' and for,.conspiracy. 45 Al-
though some. federal courts had reached the same conclusion,46 the
United States Supreme Court miannelli, and other federal courts con-
sidering the question, have shown.,this .to be a misapplication of the
"third party" exception:47
in lannelli strongly. rejected the majority's suggestion of permitting the- prosecutor to
enhance punishment for a § 1955 offense. 420 U.S. at 795.
44. See note- 33 and accompanying-text supra; note 80 ,and accompanyrig text
infra. The dissent, maintained that "[t] o infer from silence- an intention to permit
multiple punishment is a depdrture from the 'presupposition of our law to resolve
doubts, in the enforcement of a penal code against the imposition of a harsh punish-
ment."' 420 U.S. at 795 (Douglas,,J., dissenting), citing Bellv. United States, 349 U.S.
81(1955).
45. United States v. Iannelli, 477 F2d 999, 1002 (3d-Cir, 1973).
46. The major case in this line of reasoning was-United States y. Becker, ,461 F.2d
230 (2d Cir. 1972), in which seven defendants were indicted for both violation of
§ 1955 and conspiracy to violate § '1955. The Court of Ap'peals: for'the Second Circuit
held that the "additional two persons" invoked the third party exception to the Rule,
stating:
[A]s long as the conspiratorial concert of action and the substantive offense un-
derlying it are not coterminous and fewer participants are required for the com-
mission of the substantive offense than are named as joining-in'a conspiracy to
commit it, there is no infirmity in the conspiracy indictment.
461 F.2d at 234. Becker was followed in United States v. lannelli, 477 F.2d 999 (2d
Cir. 1973); United States v. Mainello, 345 F Supp. 863 (E.D.N.Y 1972); United
States v. Best, 363 F Supp. I I(S.D. Ga. 1973); United States v. Vigi, 363 F Supp.
314 (E.D. Mich. 1973).
47. lannelli v: United States, 420 U.S. at 782-83 n.15. See also United States V.
Greenberg, 334 F Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1971), where the court held that Wharton's
Rule applies to § 1955 prosecutions and dismissed the third party exception, stating:
[T] he number of parties involved is inconsequential provided that it was the con-
certed action of all that is involved. This is clearly the situation here, especially
as the number fixed by the statute is expressed as a minimum, that.ss, five or more
persons.
Id. at 1095 (citation omitted); accord, United States v. Kohne, 347 F Supp. 1178,
1186 (W.D. Pa. 1972).
For commentaries criticizing, the Becker -decision's reasoning see Note, Wharton's
Rule and Conspiracy to Operate an Illegal Gambling Business, 30 WAsH. &LEE L. REv.
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By its terms, § 1955 reaches gambling activities involving "five or
more persons." Moreover, the legislative history of the statute indi-
cates that Congress assumed that it would generally be applied in
cases in which more than the statutory minimum number were in-
volved. . . .It thus would seem anomalous to conclude that Congress
intended the substantive offense to subsume the conspiracy in one case
[with five persons] but not in the other [more than five].
The Court was correct in concluding that the third party exception
does not apply to section 1955 prosecution. Under section 1955, un-
like a "matchmaker" in an adultery case, 48 the added element of more
than five participants in the agreement amounts to nothing that was
not already present in the crime. The "matchmaker" case involves an
element completely distinct from the crime of adultery, i.e., concerted
conspiratorial action with a third person to commit the offense. In
contrast, the additional conspirators in Iannelli were not involved in a
separate and distinct criminal offense; rather, they were acting in a
capacity similar to the other five, as integral participants in a commis-
sion of a section 1955 offense. They too could be found guilty of the
substantive offense, unlike the adultery "matchmaker." As one district
court has stated, "It is not . . . the mere number charged, but
rather the nature of the 'extra' defendants which determines the
result . . . . 49 The element of concerted group action is a logical
and necessary prerequisite to the commission of the substantive of-
fense by any of the defendants. That there were more than five in the
group does not detract from the essential character of the activity as
an element of the offense.
C. Proper Application of the Rule
Disallowing multiple convictions neither defeats congressional in-
tent in the enactment of section 1955 nor renders the statute ineffec-
tive. A conviction under section 1955 alone serves the congressional
613, 621 (1973); Note, Gambling Under the Organized Crime Control Act, supra note
18, at 463.
48. See note 23 supra.
49. United States v. Figueredo, 350 F. Supp. 1031, 1035 (M.D. Fla. 1972). The
court also stated that the Becker decision, discussed supra note 46, "rested on a mis-
taken use of the third party exception," as it implied "that the mere number charged
in the indictment takes on a talismanic quality which obviates the application of the
Rule." 350 F. Supp. at 1035.
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purpose of eliminating a substantial business enterprise of gambling.
As this subpart will illustrate, as long as the government is able to
punish for the conspiracy where there is no violation of section 1955,
disallowing the conspiracy conviction will not deprive law enforce-
ment officials of any weapon needed to combat organized crime.
Prior to Iannelli, the federal courts were divided on how to apply
Wharton's Rule to section 1955. Among those courts which held the
Rule applicable,50 there was a split as to whether the conspiracy in-
dictment should be permitted. Several courts followed the classical
formulation of the Rule which forbids the indictment. 51 Such an ap-
proach overlooks the inchoate function of the law of conspiracy, how-
ever, because it precludes punishment of conspiratorial conduct which
does not constitute a substantive violation of the statute.52 Accord-
ingly, at least one federal court held that a defendant could be in-
dicted for both conspiracy and the substantive offense, but not con-
victed for both.53 Both the majority and the dissent in Iannelli agreed
50. See note 9 supra.
51. United States v. Figueredo, 350 F. Supp. 1031 (M.D. Fla. 1972); United States
v. Greenberg, 334 F. Supp. 1092 (N.D. Ohio 1971). See also United States v. Hunter,
478 F.2d 1019, 1026 (7th Cir. 1973), where Judge Stevens stated: "[E]ven though
five or more persons are named in the indictment, a charge of conspiracy to violate
§ 1955 may not be maintained if it 'comprehends nothing more than the agreement
which those persons necessarily performed by the commission of the substantive of-
fense itself."
The Rule previously had been accepted by the federal courts in its classical form.
See, e.g., Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112, 122 (1932), where the Court stated:
[W] here it is impossible under any circumstances to commit the substantive of-
fense without cooperative action, the preliminary agreement between the same
parties to commit the offense is not an indictable conspiracy either at common
law ... or under the federal statute.
See also United States v. Center Veal & Beef Co., 162 F.2d 766, 770 (2d Cir. 1947)
(L. Hand, J.); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946); United States v.
Sager, 49 F.2d 725 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. New York Cent. & H.R.R. Co.,
146 F.298 (S.D.N.Y. 1906).
52. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.04, Comment at 173 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1960).
53. United States v. Kohne, 347 F. Supp. 1178 (W.D. Pa. 1972), articulated this
modification clearly:
[I] f a substantive violation of § 1955 is proved, the same concerted action prov-
ing this violation cannot be used to automatically convict the defendants of con-
spiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 . ...
But... this does not mean that defendants are entitled to have the conspiracy
count dismissed. The general conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, can punish con-
spiratorial conduct which does not amount to a substantive violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1955.
Id. at 1186. Cf. United States v. Iannelli, 339 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Pa. 1972), where
the district court on pretrial motion held that Wharton's Rule applies "only when the
wrongdoing is actually committed," and thus the decision on whether the indictment
may stand should be determined at the conclusion of the prosecutor's case. Id. at
181-82.
155
Washington Law Review Vol. 52: 142, 1976
upon such a modification of the classic Rule.5 4
This latter approach seems more appropriate, because it satisfies
the justifying rationale of the Rule,55 but does not allow a conspirator
to escape all punishment when not convicted for the substantive of-
fense. A conviction for the substantive offense, which requires con-
spiratorial agreement, should satisfy the social concerns justifying
punishment for the conspiracy. It fulfills the group criminality aspect
of conspiracy as section 1955 itself is directed to "the special danger
incident to group activity." 56 Because the substantive offense has been
committed, the inchoate aspect of conspiracy is irrelevant. On the
other hand, where no conviction for section 1955 is procured, these
social concerns are not satisfied and the inchoate aspect of conspiracy
survives to justify the conviction.
III. THE DOUBLE JEOPARDY ISSUE
The Iannelli Court stated that Wharton's Rule is not based on prin-
ciples of double jeopardy. 57 Yet, the Rule is designed to protect
54. The majority opinion stated:
We do not consider initial dismissal of the conspiracy charge to be required in such
a case. When both charges are considered at a single trial, the real problem is the
avoidance of dual punishment. This problem is analogous to that presented by
the threat of conviction for a greater and lesser-included offense, and should be
treated in a similar manner.
420 U.S. at 786 n.18. Justice Douglas stated that the conspiracy "should be charged as
a preparatory offense that merges with the completed crime, and considered by the
jury only if it first acquits the defendant of the § 1955 charge." Id. at 797.
55. See notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra. The only aspect of this ap-
proach which may be criticized is that it gives the prosecution the procedural advan-
tage of introducing evidence that would not be admissible at a trial for the substantive
offense alone. See note 35 supra.
56. See text accompanying note 12 supra.
57. 420 U.S. at 782. This statement is somewhat puzzling because Wharton's Rule.
as first developed, was based specifically on and limited to principles of double jeopardy.
See F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW 198 (2d ed. 1852) and the case which was the basis
of the Rule, Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. 226, 227 (1850). Later editions of
Wharton's treatise expanded the proposition to its present form. See note 17 and ac-
companying text supra. Although the precise foundation of the Rule has never been
fully explained by the Court, Iannelli is the first case where the Court has said that the
Rule is not based at all on double jeopardy principles. The statement is a total rever-
sal of the Rule's original justification.
In fact. even the Government contended that Wharton's Rule is rooted in double
jeopardy protection:
Wharton's Rule ...properly understood, is simply a specific application to con-
spiracy prosecutions of the more general rule, rooted in the Fifth Amendment-
ment's protection against double jeopardy, that forbids cumulative punishment for
any two offenses arising out of the same conduct, where one offense is necessarily
included within the other. In such circumstances, it is presumed that Congress in-
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against multiple punishment for the same .offense, which, -is ,ne of,
three constitutional protections guaranteed by-'.the- double jeopardy
clause. 58 Therefore, because, lannelli's conspiracy conviction required
proof of no fact which was not also essential to proof of- the gambling'
violation, under section 1955,5s there wouldseem to'be a-prima facie
case of multiple' punishment for the same-offense:60, Confronted with
similar situations, several-lower courts -prior to Jannelli used Whar- ,
ton's 'Rule to -invalidate the -conspiracy count.61 In United States, v
Schaefer,62 the Court of Appeals-for the Eighth Circuit -avoided the
growing conflict-over reliance on the Rule byholding that convictions
tended the punishment for the greater offense to include punishment for any
necessarily included offense.
Brief for Respondent at 9-10, lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975).
58. U.S. CONST. amend. V- "[N] or shall any person be subject tothe same offense
to be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb." The double jeopardy guarantee consists of
three separate constitutional protections. It protects against a second prosecution
for the same offense after acquittal, it protects against a, second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction, and it protects against multiple, punishments
for the same offense.,
North Carolina v. Pearce, 395, U.S. 711, 717 (1969); Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra
note 43, at 265-66. It was not until joinder became a permissible and widespread
practice that multiple punishment at ,the, same, trial, became an issue. Until that time
multiple punishment could only result from multiple trials. Nevertheless, .the intent to
prevent multiple punishment for the same offense is apparent from early constitutional
history. James Madison's first proposal of a double jeopardy provision for the fifth
amendment stated: "No person shall be subject, except in cases of impeachment, to
more than one punishment or one trial for the same offense." 1 ANNALS OF CONG.-433
(1789-91) [1789-1824].
Justice Douglas was -the only member of the Court in lannelli who stated that the
defendants' conspiracy convictions. were violative of double jeopardy principles. 420
U.S. at 792-93.
59. See note 25 supra.
60. Unlike Wharton's Rule, which is a judicial canon' of, construction, double
jeopardy protection against multiple punishment is a constitutional limitation upon the
courts. This aspect of double jeopardy is not, however, a constitutional restriction
upon the legislature; a clear legislative intent to provide for multiple punishment under
§ 1955 and the general conspiracy statute would have overcome double jeopardy pro-
tections as well as the presumptive application of Wharton's Rule. See note 68 and
accompanying text infra. In such circumstances, the due process clause"and the-pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishments would seem to be the only limitations
on legislative power.
61. See note 9 supra. The reasoning in several of these cases was at times based
on double jeopardy considerations as much as on Wharton's Rule. See United States
v. Kohne, 347 F Supp. 1178, 1186 (W.D. Pa. 1972), holding that because concerted
action was a prerequisite to a § 1955 conviction, the same concerted action could not
be used to convict'the defendants under § 371. -In invoking -Wharton's Rule, the court
stated that the conspiracy violation did not involve proof of a fact which was not
also essential to the substantive violation-a double'jeopardy 'test. See-,also United
States v. Hunter, 478 F.2d -1019 (7th Cir. 1973), where the court! quoted the 'Block-
burger test of conspiracy in its Wharton's Rule analysis. See notes 69'& 70 and accom-
panying text infra.




for conspiracy to commit a section 1955 offense are in violation of the
fifth amendment's double jeopardy prohibition of multiple punish-
ment. The majority opinion in Iannelli, however, discusses the double
jeopardy issue only by way of footnote. 63 Without discussing the
Schaefer decision, 64 Justice Powell in dicta indicated adherence to
the theoretical "same evidence" test of double jeopardy, which would
allow multiple punishment under section 1955. This part discusses the
double jeopardy issues raised by the Iannelli decision, and concludes
that the Court failed to consider adequately the multiple punishment
issue. Additionally, two alternative tests are offered to correct the in-
adequacy of applying the same evidence test to inchoate offenses.
A. Conspiracy and Double Jeopardy
The general rule, as set forth in an established line of Supreme
Court cases, is that conspiracy and the substantive offense are distinct
and separately punishable crimes. 65 Nevertheless the conspiracy con-
viction in Iannelli does not properly fall within those cases because
conspiracy is a necessarily included element of a section 1955 viola-
tion.66 But even when regarded solely as a preparatory offense, the
63. The Court stated:
The test articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
serves a generally similar function of identifying congressional intent to impose
separate sanctions for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or
transaction.... [T] he Court's application of the [Blockburger] test focuses on the
statutory elements of the offense. If each requires proof of a fact that the other
does not. the Blockbarger test is satisfied, notwithstanding a substantial overlap in
the proof offered to establish the crimes .... We think the Blockburger test would
be satisfied in this case. The essence of the crime of conspiracy is agreement....
an element not contained in the statutory definition of the § 1955 offense. In a
similar fashion, proof of violation of § 1955 requires establishment of a fact not
required for conviction for conspiracy to violate that statute. To establish viola-
tion of § 1955 the prosecution must prove that the defendants actually did "con-
duct. finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of an illegal gambling
business." ...
420 U.S. at 785 n.17 (citations omitted).
64. Certiorari in the Schaefer case was denied after the lannelli decision. See note
62 supra.
65. See, e.g., Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 11 (1954) (defendants convicted
of violation of mail fraud statute, violation of National Stolen Property Act, and con-
spiracy to commit such offenses); Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946)
(defendants convicted of violations of the Internal Revenue Code and conspiracy);
United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78 (1915) (defendants convicted of violation
of bankruptcy act and conspiracy).
66. But see American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946), which
upheld convictions for monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. The conspiracy
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better view is that a conspiracy to commit an offense is not punishable
if the offense has been consummated.6 7
In regard to multiple punishment, the significance of the double
jeopardy guarantee is that it serves as a check on the power of the
courts and prosecutors to multiply punishment for a single act.68 It is
therefore necessary to examine the most relevant of several tests which
have been developed to determine whether multiple convictions such
as those which the section 1955 defendants received are in violation
of double jeopardy principles.
B. The Same Evidence Test
The test for multiple punishment cited most often is the "same evi-
dence" test of Blockburger v. United States.69 It provides that where
conduct constitutes a violation of two separate statutory provisions,
the test to determine whether there are one or two offenses is "whether
each provision requires proof of an additional fact which the other
does not."70 The application of this test is broad, permitting both con-
victions if one offense is hypothetically provable by different facts.71
The same evidence test is based upon theoretical rather than factual
distinctions. Any time different statutory provisions are pleaded, it
may be argued that different evidence is necessary to prove the sep-
arate charges. But where two or more statutes apply to the same con-
to monopolize was a necessary prerequisite to the actual monopolization conviction, but
was nevertheless held to be separately punishable.
67. See notes 86 & 87 and accompanying text infra.
68.
There is no doubt that the legislature can define offenses to provide explicitly the
penalty which will attach to a given kind of conduct. Double jeopardy does not
limit the legislature's power in this respect. Rather, it limits the courts' power to
cumulate convictions and punishment when the legislature's will is'not explicit.
Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 38, at 302. This limitation on the courts is par-
ticularly important in light of the fact that appellate courts have virtually no power to
review sentences.
69. Blockburgerv. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).
70. Id. at 304. Blockburger held that one sale of morphine not in or from the orig-
inal stamped package, and without written order constitutes two separately punishable
offenses. In Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (5-4 decision), reaffirming
the Blockburger decision, the Court held that it was not a violation of double jeopardy
for a person to be convicted of three crimes, and consecutively sentenced on each
count, for a single sale of narcotics. The fact that three statutory provisions covered
the transaction was sufficient for the majority.
71. In Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. at 785 n.17, Justice Powell's opinion
stated that "The Court's application of the test focuses on the statutory elements
of the offense," rather than the actual course of conduct or proof used.
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duct, and the evidence used to prove one count is also used to prove
an additional count, it is not meaningful for a court to say the of-
fenses are separable because they require different evidence.
As applied to conspiracy, the same evidence test would never pro-
hibit a conspiracy conviction because the substantive offense requires
proof of the completed criminal act whereas the conspiracy does not.
Accordingly, use of the narrowly defined test, as recognized in Ian-
nelli, would result in a finding that the simultaneous convictions are
valid.7 ?
The extreme formalism of such an approach is unwarranted.7 3
First, as United States v. Schaefer noted, there is "no element in the
conspiracy which is not present in the completed crime. 74 Thus,
while the statutes do not by definition require the same evidence, the
evidence used to procure a conviction under section 1955 will always
provide sufficient evidence to establish a conspiracy under section
371. In this regard, there is an "identity of offenses" 75 because the
same evidence is used to convict and punish the defendants twice for
the same offensive conduct.
Secondly, the Blockburger case, which established the same evi-
dence test, is not similar to cases of conviction for conspiracy and vio-
lation of section 1955 for the following reasons: (a) the statutory
72. Under the Blockburger standard, it is apparent that § 1955 "requires proof of
an additional fact which the other [§ 271] does not." 284 U.S. at 304. To violate
§ 1955 the defendants must have conducted, financed, managed, supervised, directed
or owned all or part of an illegal gambling business. Only the conspiracy to partake in
such action is necessary for a violation of § 371.
This footnote 17 in lannelli is additionally troublesome because it states that the
same evidence test serves to identify "congressional intent to impose separate sanctions
for multiple offenses arising in the course of a single act or transaction" (emphasis
added). It is completely unreasonable to attribute to a legislature a conscious decision
or intent that each and every statute it passes should be independently and equally
applicable to a course of criminal conduct, merely because the requisite statutory ele-
ments of an offense can be hypothetically distinguished from other statutes touching
upon the same prohibited subject matter. A consistent application of such an approach
would require, among other things, that one who has committed an offense also be
convicted of attempt, for the same evidence test can distinguish attempt as easily as
conspiracy.
73. The theory behind the same evidence test "belongs to the heritage of extreme
formalism transmitted to its heirs by 18th century criminal procedure." It was a tor-
tuous attempt to escape the formalism of procedural devices favoring the defendant-
devices which no longer pose a threat to the prosecution. Kirchheimer, The Act, The
Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE L.J. 513, 528-29 (1940). See also Note, Twice
in Jeopardy, supra note 38, at 270-74 (1965). It should thus be a liberally construed
test that is used, if at all, to focus on the evidence presented in a particular case, not
hypothetical evidence.
74. 510 F.2d 1307, 1313 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
75. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 644 (1946).
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offenses in Blbckburger were strict liability -crim6 6- oItclvti - di d
not depend on the existenc& of mens rea, mterit:' or agreement; (b)
neither offense in -Blockburger was necessarily included, in the other;
and (c) Blockburger did-not-involve an 'inchoate offense committed
pursuant to the commissioii of the~substantive offense. Thus, the-test,
when taken out of 'its original context and: applied to section 1955,
proves to be inadequate, beca'use -as applied to inchoate offenses, it-
will always permit multiple convictions. 7T7In -addition; a ne6essarily in-
cluded offense has been a proper exception to the test's- applicabil-
ity 78
Furthermore, under the Court's "rule of lemty,"79 which is the same
as the common law rule requiring that penal statutes be strictly con-
strued, doubts concerninglegislative intent should 'be resolved against
the creation of multiple units of c6nviction.8 0 The underlying- ratio:-
nale is that the legislature can clearly prescribe the 'punishment it sees
fit for any particular 'crime, and a pgrs6fi's liberty'should 'be "forfeited
only if the legislature has clearly indicated that it should and' only to
the extent that it has plainly authorized."8' Absent such 'a legislative
mandate author7Ang multiple convictions, the rule restrains courts
from multiplying punishment 'where the harmresultsfrom the same
physical action.82 By using this rule of statutory construction, the Su-
76'. See-United States v. Balint,'2'58 U.S.250 (1922), which held that the narcotic'
act involved in the Blockburger decision did not require scienter as an element -of the
offense.
77. The United States Supreme Court has-never applied the"Btockburger test to
any case to 'find that the multiple convictions were impermissible. See, e.g., note 66
supra. But see Pereira v. United States, 347 U:S. 'T(1954)'. Convictions on both the
substantive and general conspiracy counts were upheld, but the'Court, was' careful to
point out that (1) "Pereira's conviction on' the 'substantive counts does not dejhehd on
any agreement," id. at i1, and (2) "the charge' of conspiracy requires pro6f not essen-
tial to the convictions on the substantive offense'," id.' at 11-42.
78. See Kirchheimer, sqpra note 73, at-529-3 1; notes 97-100'nf-a.
79. 420 U.S. at 798 (Brennan, J:, diss eiting). ' '. " '
80. Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S. 415 (1959) (defendantbank robber could
not be convicted of both rdbbery-and receiving stolen money); Ladner v. United States,
358 U.S. 169 (1958) (defendant. liable for one assault where'single discharge from a
shotgun wounded two officers); Prince v. United States, 352 U.S: 322 (1957)'(crime
of entry with intent to rob nbt' cumulatively convictable With 'the consummated'idb-
berty); Bell v. -United States,-349 U.S. 81 (1955) (transporting' more than one woman
at one time in interstate commerce constitutes one violation of the Mann Act). This
rule, however, has not always been followed. See Gore v. United States, 357U.S. 386
(1958), discussed-note 70 supra.
81. Note, Twice in Jeopardy, supra note 43, at 316.
82. One commentator'has-gone so far as to ciaracterize' the rule 'is a "c6iistitu-
tionally compelled canon of constructiofi" based on'double jeopardy principles, which
requires "that in determining the unit of punishment f5r related offenses, doubts should
be resolved against punishing twice for what may be a single offense." Id. at 316-17.
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preme Court has been able to prevent multiple punishment for the
same conduct and thus avoid the presumptive separability inherent in
the Blockburger test. 83 This practice, however, has also allowed the
Court to avoid a thorough analysis of double jeopardy principles as a
restraint on the courts' power to impose multiple punishment. The fol-
lowing tests, though not fully embraced by a majority of the Court,
serve as a viable alternative to the same evidence test. They serve the
dual function of protecting those interests the law is intended to safe-
guard, and protecting an offender from multiple punishment.
C. The Preparatory Offense Test
Where one offense consists only of preparation to commit another
offense, the former is not punishable if there is conviction for the
latter. This principle is generally recognized for the crime of attempt 84
but has not been embraced by the United States Supreme Court in
regard to conspiracy.85 It has been adopted, however, by several state
statutes86 and the Model Penal Code87 in order to limit conspiracy
convictions.
Application of the preparatory offense test to actions under section
83. See note 80 supra. In Prince, the Court avoided application of the Blockburger
test by saying that it was not "particularly helpful to us because we are dealing with a
unique statute of limited purpose and an inconclusive legislative history." 352 U.S. at
325.
84. See, e.g., R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 553 (2d ed. 1969).
85. See, e.g., Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). The lack of recog-
nition of conspiracy as a nonpunishable preparatory offense has been long criticized.
For example, in 1949 Kirchheimer stated:
In logic, there is no reason why conspiracy should not merge into the consum-
mated crime as under the old doctrine of merger. But, for some time, the con-
spiracy category has been the prosecutor's most cherished device ...
None of the legalistic reasons advanced to prove the distinction between con-
spiracy and consummated crime seem to withstand critical analysis.
Kirchheimer, supra note 73, at 518-19.
86. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38 § 8-5 (1962); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
2923.01(G) (eff. 7-1-76); ORE. REV. STAT. § 161.485(3) (1971); UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-4-302 (1974); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 939.72(2) (1955). These statutes prohibit all
multiple convictions for conspiracy and the substantive offense, irrespective of the
conspiracy's scope. Several other states have similar legislation pending. See Note,
Conspiracy: Statutory Reform Since the Model Penal Code, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1122,
1181 n.338 (1975).
87. The MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07()(b) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962), states
that a defendant may not "be convicted of more than one offense if: One offense
consists only of a conspiracy or other form of preparation to commit the other." This
approach has been adopted in three states: ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-105(l)(b) (1976);




1955 would serve to prevent unjustified conspiracy convictions. As
previously discussed,88 a conspiracy charge should only be maintained
when it serves one of the recognized functions of conspiracy law.
Once the substantive offense has been consummated, additional pun-
ishment for conspiracy can only be justified by the existence of a
clearly identifiable89 social threat greater than that posed by the con-
summated crime.90 Therefore, where the substantive offense encom-
passes and protects the same concerns that are threatened by the con-
spiracy, a conviction for the latter has no purpose other than in-
creasing punishment beyond that prescribed by the legislature. This
reasoning illustrates that the addition of a conspiracy charge to a sec-
tion 1955 conviction is an example of unjustified multiple punish-
ment.
In order to accommodate the argument that a conspiracy with an
objective broader than the commission of a specific offense presents
an additional danger, the Model Penal Code does not provide for an
absolute prohibition of a conspiracy conviction in the event the crime
is consummated: 91
[T] he limitation of the draft is confined to the situation where the
completed offense was the sole criminal objective of the conspiracy.
Therefore, there may be conviction of both a conspiracy and a com-
pleted offense committed pursuant to that conspiracy if the prosecu-
tion shows that the objective of the conspiracy was the commission of
additional offenses.
88. See notes 11-15 and accompanying text supra.
89. The burden of proving this additional distinct threat of the conspiracy must be
placed on the prosecution. It is far too easy to invoke the traditional rationale that
the danger of conspiracy is not "limited to the particular end toward which it has
embarked," but rather "makes more likely the commission of crimes unrelated to the
original purpose." Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961). Unless
the prosecution demonstrates to the satisfaction of a court that the objective of the
particular conspiracy was the commission of additional offenses, the conspiracy should
not be punished if the crime has been completed.
90. The inchoate function of conspiracy law cannot be served when the substantive
offense, which is the criminal object of the concerted action, has been committed. See
note 11 and accompanying text supra. Assuming conviction for the substantive of-
fense, the rationale for allowing punishment for both conspiracy and the offense that
is the objective of the conspiracy is that each is aimed at a separate evil. See, e.g.,
Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593-94 (1961); United States v. Rabinowich,
238 U.S. 78 (1915). This reasoning is incorporated into the MODEL PENAL CoDE's rule
on when conspiracy convictions will be allowed, despite conviction for the substantive
offense. See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
91. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08, Comment at 32 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956).
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The Court in Iannelli, drawing from conclusions of the Senate Report
on the Act, found that "[1] arge-scale gambling enterprises were seen
to be both a substantive evil and a source of funds for other criminal
conduct." 92 This finding may be true as a general proposition, but it is
insufficient to prove that the objectives of any particular conspiracy
include the commission of additional offenses. 93 Thus, in the absence
of other evidence to show such an objective, a conspiracy charge
should be dismissed upon conviction for violation of section 1955. 94
The preparatory offense rationale is gaining increased acceptance
among a number of states, 95 and its logic is influencing the develop-
ment of a new federal criminal code. 96 It is submitted that adoption of
this rule by the Supreme Court would prevent unjustified convictions
that ensue from Blockburger doctrine, including the conspiracy con-
victions allowed in Iannelli.
92. 420 U.S. at 787.
93. The opinion of Justice Powell in lannelli found that large scale gambling activ-
ities, which are the object of § 1955, are "likely to generate additional agreements to
engage in other criminal endeavors." 420 U.S. at 784. However, this general observa-
tion falls far short of establishing that every conspiracy to violate § 1955 has objec-
tives beyond the scope of the planned § 1955 offense.
94. Justice Douglas, dissenting in lanneli, stated: "Conspiracy if charged in a §
1955 prosecution should be charged as a preparatory offense that merges with the
completed crime, and considered by the jury only if it first acquits the defendant of the
§ 1955 charge." 420 U.S. at 797. He was not entirely at ease, however, with the Gov-
ernment's ability to charge conspiracy in the § 1955 prosecution. While seeming to
accept such a tactic in the above quotation, he further stated: "I would require the
prosecutor to choose between § 371 and § 1955 as the instrument for criminal punish-
ment." Id. at 792. Whether both counts can be brought simultaneously depends on
balancing the procedural disadvantage placed on the defendant by permitting the con-
current conspiracy charge, see note 35 supra, against the value of the conspiracy sanc-
tion in reaching such conduct, see notes 51-53 supra.
95. See notes 86 & 87 supra.
96. The Brown Commission's proposed new federal criminal code seemed to fall
short of the acceptance of the included offense and preparatory offense rationale of
the MODEL PENAL CODE, see notes 68 & 70 supra. The FINAL REPORT OF THE NAT'L
COMM'N ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS (Proposed Code 1971) (18 U.S.C.
§ 3204(2)) provides:
Multiple Sentences. A defendant may not be sentenced consecutively for more
than one offense to the extent:
(a) one offense is an included offense of the other;
(b) one offense consists only of a conspiracy, attempt, solicitation or other
form of preparation to commit, or facilitation of, the other; or
(c) the offenses differ only in that one is defined to prohibit a designated kind
of conduct generally and the other to prohibit a specific instance of such conduct.
Thus, while a defendant might be convicted of both conspiracy to violate § 1955 and
its violation, he could not be consecutively sentenced for the offenses. The proposal
does not prohibit the concurrent prosecution that occurred in Robert lannelli's case,
but subsections (a), (b), and (c) would prevent multiplication of punishment in the
context of § 1955. See I WORKING PAPERS OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED-
ERAL CRIMINAL LAvs 336-41 (July 1970).
The Comments to this section of the proposed code repudiate the same evidence
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D The Included Offense Test
The included offense test provides that one may not be convicted of
two offenses when one of them is necessarily included in the other.
The test for inclusion has been stated as whether "the proof necessary
to establish the greater offense will of necessity establish every element
of the lesser offense."'97 Normally this test would not bar a conspiracy
conviction, because most substantive offenses do not require conspira-
torial action as an element of the offense. 98 Section 1955 of the Or-
ganized Crime Control Act, however, does require criminal concert of
action amongst five or more persons. Utilization of the included of-
fense test to bar conspiracy convictions under section 1955 would be
completely consistent with the theory and legal justification of con-
spiracy As previously shown, the inchoate function of conspiracy law
is irrelevant where there has been conviction for the substantive of-
fense. 99 As for the additional danger rationale, there is no special ele-
ment of danger present in the conspiratorial activity which is not also
necessarily included in the substantive offense itself. Application of
the included offense test is not precluded by the rationale of the
Blockburger decision. 100 Furthermore, if applied to the Iannelli-type
conspiracy convictions, this test would avoid the unwarranted multi-
test of Blockburger and Gore (see note 70 supra):
It seems beyond argument that the appropriate sentence and the number of years
for which a man shall be punished for an offense is not rationally a function of
the number of statutory violations into which his conduct may be parsed by a
clever pleader. The Draft, therefore, is careful not to use the Blockburger ap-
proach and to this extent changes existing Federal law.
Id. at 341. Section 2304(a) of the current version of Senate Bill I provides for such a
prohibition against multiple punishment. See S. REP. No. 94-00, 94th Cong., 1st Sess.
925 (1975).
97 MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.08, Comment at 40 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1956). The
included offense exception to, multiple punishment is codified by the MODEL PENAL CODE
in § 1.07(i)(a) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
521(c) (1975), which states:
No person may be convicted of conspiracy to commit an offense when an element
of the offense is agreement with the person with whom he is alleged to have con-
spired, or when the person with whom he is alleged to have conspired is neces-
sarily involved with him in the commission of the offense.
98. See, e.g., Pereira v United States, 347 U.S. 1 (1954), where the defendant was
convicted of conspiracy to violate and violation of the National Stolen Property Act,
which prohibited transportation of stolen property in interstate commerce.
99. See note II and accompanying text supra.
100. Unlike lanelli, Blockburger involved neither a conspiracy nor a necessarily
included offense. See notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra. Both the Schaefer
discussed note 62 supra, and Hunter decisions, discussed note 25 supra, in utilizing
the Blockburger test, incorporated the necessarily included offense rationale to dis-
allow convictions for conspiring to violate § 1955. Accord, Thomas v. State, 353 A.2d
240 (Md. App. 1976).
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ple convictions allowed by the same evidence test. Such a result would
be in accordance with the double jeopardy principles.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, however, has held
in United States v. Jeffers,'O' that lannelli makes the necessarily in-
cluded offense test inapplicable for "complex statutory crimes," and
instead establishes a new double jeopardy approach toward such
crimes. In Jeffers the defendant was convicted of both a continuing
criminal enterprise under section 848 of the Comprehensive Drug
Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970,102 and a conspiracy to
distribute narcotics. The substantive offense required the same con-
cert of action that constituted the conspiracy and the court indeed
found that conspiracy was a necessarily included offense. 10 3
The court stated that prior to Iannelli, conviction for both the
greater and lesser included offense was prohibited. 04 It then acknowl-
edged that "[f] or offenses derived from the common law and for sim-
ple statutory crimes," this rule is still valid and important, because
"[i] t would be totally improper for society after it had chosen the
proper degree of censure and punishment for an individual" to obtain
another conviction for the same conduct.' 05 But for "complex statu-
tory crimes," the court held that the included offense test was not ap-
plicable. Instead the court stated that Iannelli had transformed Block-
burger into a test of legislative intent.106 Such an analysis has several
101. 532 F.2d 1101 (7th Cir. 1976). lannelli has also been followed in United
States v. Pezzino, 535 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1976).
102. 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1972). Subsection (b) defines the offense in the following
manner:
(b) For purposes of subsection (a) of this section, a person is engaged in a
continuing criminal enterprise if-
(1) he violates any provision of this subchapter or subchapter II of this
chapter the punishment for which is a felony, and
(2) such violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of this sub-
chapter or subchapter II of this chapter-
(A) which are undertaken by such person in concert with five or more
other persons with respect to whom such person occupies a position of
organizer, a supervisory position, or any other position of management.
and
(B) from which such person obtains substantial income or resources.
103. 532 F.2d at 1106.
104. Id. at 1109.
105. Id. at 1109-10.
106. Id. at 1109. The result of characterizing Blockburger "'as a tool of statutory
construction rather than a double jeopardy decision." id., could mean either: (a)
anytime Congress enacts two statutes that theoretically require different evidence, a
court will infer an intent that each be separately punishable, or (b) the court aban-
doned the same evidence test and simply will look for legislative intent that there be
multiple punishment.
The Jeffers court may have misconstrued the lannelli footnote 17 dealing with
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weaknesses. The court neither defined "complex statutory crimes,"
nor explained why it would not also be "totally improper for society
after it had chosen the proper degree of censure and punishment for
an individual" who commits a complex statutory crime to inflict
multiple punishment. In addition, the court ignored Schaefer, the only
decision which has squarely faced the double jeopardy issue.107
The court in Jeffers went on to find a congressional intent to author-
ize multiple punishment for both the substantive offense and con-
spiracy, because the offenses "are directed at quite different results."'108
The purpose of conspiracy law was found to be aimed at the evil of
collective criminal agreement, 09 whereas the purpose of continuing
criminal enterprise was found to be "to punish and take [offenders]
out of circulation." 11 0 As illustrated earlier,' however, once the sub-
stantive offense has been committed, conviction solely under the col-
lective criminal agreement statute will serve to punish for the requisite,
conspiratorial action and take offenders out of circulation. Congress
intended a harsh sanction for such criminals, but it is provided by
section 848 of the Act. 1 2 To infer a legislative intent to permit multi-
ple punishment under two statutes solely from a legislature's desire to
sentence criminals heavily for violation of one of the statutes is an
abusive exercise of statutory construction. It is to be presumed that
the legislature, in deciding upon the punishment for violating a partic-
ular statute, considered all the elements of the offense in setting the
Blockburger. The Supreme Court clearly adhered to a strict theoretical same evidence
test which would allow both convictions even if one offense was necessarily included
in the other. Jeffers indicates that Blockburger does not say this, but rather recognizes
the included offense test. Compare 420 U.S. at 785 n.17 with 532 F.2d at 1109.
107. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text supra. Contrary to the implication
of the court's statement in Jeffers that the lannelli Court decided the double jeopardy
issue, the petitioners in lannelli did not challenge their convictions on the basis of the
fifth amendment guarantee against double jeopardy, but only on the basis of Wharton's
Rule. See Brief for Petitioner, lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770 (1975).
108. 532F.2datll10.
109. Id. For a more complete discussion of the purpose of the law of conspiracy
see notes 11-15 and accompanying text supra.
110. 532F.2datll10.
Ill. See notes 11-15 and accompanying text supra.
112. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) provides:
(a) (1) Any person who engages in a continuing criminal enterprise shall be
sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be less than 10 years and
which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not more than $100,000, and
to the forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2); except that if any person engages in
such activity after one or more prior convictions of him under this section have
become final, he shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which may not be
less than 20 years and which may be up to life imprisonment, to a fine of not
more than $200,000, and to the forfeiture prescribed in paragraph (2).
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allowable punishment. The fact that a statutory scheme is "complex"
should not deprive a defendant of protection from multiple punish-
ment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Study of Title VIII of the Organized Crime Control Act reveals
that Congress intended to proscribe a particular course of conduct
rather than its elements. The lannelli Court erred in finding a congres-
sional intent to separate the elements of the offense and authorize sep-
arate punishment for each, thereby rebutting the presumed applica-
bility of Wharton's Rule. It further failed to address adequately the
double jeopardy principles prohibiting multiple punishment for the
same conduct. A closer examination by the Court of the doctrinal
underpinnings of conspiracy and the prohibitions of multiple punish-
ment should result in a judicial change of course. It is unfortunate that
the only present movement to abolish the judicially created Block-
burger rule is in Congress and in the state legislatures.
The soundest approach for the Court to follow would be a replace-
ment of the same evidence test with the necessarily included offense
and preparatory offense tests. This approach restricts the courts'
ability to cumulate convictions for a single course of criminal con-
duct, while providing a workable standard that is not subject to the
various interpretations and manipulations of the "same evidence" test.
Furthermore, it preserves both the doctrinal justifications for con-
spiracy as a criminal offense and the objectives sought to be accom-
plished by the substantive offense.
Christopher L. Koch
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